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REMARK ON THE HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT
JONATHAN STERLING
Abstract. What is the proper explanation of intuitionistic hypothet-
ical judgment, and thence propositional implication? The answer is
unclear from the writings of Brouwer and Heyting, who in their life-
times propounded multiple (sometimes conflicting) explanations of the
hypothetical judgment. To my mind, the determination of an acceptable
explanation must take into account its adequacy for the expression of
the bar theorem and, more generally, the development of an open-ended
framework for transcendental arguments in mathematics.
1. Judgments and Propositions
The distinction between the propositions and the judgments (assertions)
is an old one, but prior to Martin-Lo¨f, the significance of assertions was
limited to the affirmation of the truth of propositions. Following Martin-Lo¨f
[8], forms of judgment other than P true are recognized, including P prop.
What is the difference between a judgment (assertion) on the one hand,
and a proposition on the other hand? A judgment is an act or an experience,
whereas a proposition is a mathematical object which may be experienced
in different ways. For instance, the assertion of the truth of a proposition
(i.e. P true) consists in the fulfillment of the intention expressed by the
proposition, while the recognition of an object as a proposition (i.e. P prop)
is the act of understanding this intention.
In addition to the categorical judgments above, higher-order forms of
judgment are also explained, including the hypothetical judgment and the
general judgment. Now, the primitive hypothetical judgment J2 (J1),
1 was
explained by Martin-Lo¨f in terms of hypothetical proof or demonstration,
which he defined as follows:
The notion of hypothetical proof [demonstration], in turn,
which is a primitive notion, is explained by saying that it is
a proof [demonstration] which, when supplemented by proofs
1Hypothetical judgment is to be distinguished from the sequent judgments Γ ⊢ · · · , which
are not even higher-order judgments at all.
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[demonstrations] of the hypotheses, or antecedents, becomes
a proof [demonstration] of the thesis, or consequent.2 [8]
In 1956, Heyting propounded his version of what has come to be known
as the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic logic,
by explaining the assertion conditions of the propositions. Note that where
Heyting says “assert a proposition”, in light of Martin-Lo¨f’s clarification, we
must read “assert the truth of a proposition”. Heyting’s explanation of the
assertion conditions for the truth of implication were as follows:
The implication p ⊃ q may be asserted if and only if we
possess a construction r, which, joined to any construction
proving p (supposing the latter be effected), would automat-
ically effect a construction of q. [5]
Now, Martin-Lo¨f would probably consider the parenthetical “supposing
the latter be effected” to be superfluous, since to assume a judgment is the
same as to assume that you know it [8]. So, Heyting’s definition might be
rewritten today as:
P ⊃ Q true may be asserted if and only if we possess a con-
struction r, which, joined to any demonstration of P true,
would automatically effect a demonstration of Q true.
Martin-Lo¨f explained the truth of an implication by appealing to the
hypothetical judgment, so we should be able to factor Heyting’s explanation
through it in a similar way:
P ⊃ Q true may be asserted if and only if we may assert
Q true (P true).
In fact, if we make this transformation, we shall have arrived at some-
thing very similar to Martin-Lo¨f’s definition of propositional implication.
This inference is, at least, valid with respect to Martin-Lo¨f’s definition,
but it is merely an extensional specification for the meaning of the judg-
ment: it expresses the material equivalence of the assertions P ⊃ Q true and
Q true (P true), but it does not contain an actual explanation of P ⊃ Q true,
which would need to be in the form “To know P ⊃ Q true is to know...”.
It is tempting to rewrite the definition in the following way:
(*) To know P ⊃ Q true is to know Q true (P true).
2 I prefer the term demonstration to the more ambiguous proof, since the former is clearly
an act, whereas the latter may be read as either an act or as a mathematical object.
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However, as a definition, this is impredicative. Following Dummett [2] and
Martin-Lo¨f, we must start from a distinction between the direct experience of
truth (which we shall call verification) and the indirect experience (which we
shall just call truth). Then, the intention of a proposition is its verification,
and the truth of a proposition is the experience of a means of fulfillment for
that intention:
To know P ⊃ Q ver is to know Q true (P true).
Then, to know P ⊃ Q true is to have a means of verifying P ⊃ Q, that
is, to have a plan to experience P ⊃ Q ver .
2. The Proof Interpretation
When we rewrote Heyting’s explanation of the assertion conditions for the
truth of an implication to appeal to hypothetical judgment, we implicitly
assumed that the instantiation of Martin-Lo¨f’s hypothetical judgment would
preserve the meaning of the original statement.
This, however, may be too much to ask, since in modern proof-theoretic
accounts of meaning, the hypothetical judgment as explained by Martin-Lo¨f
must be understood in a very strong sense, where its proof shall be an object
with a “hole” in it, which could be plugged with a proof for the antecedent
to yield a proof for the consequent: that is, it is not enough that one should
have a way of transforming the proof of the antecedent into a proof of the
consequent, but one must have a uniform way to do so.
Anticipating the “proof interpretation” of intuitionistic logic, Brouwer
also had come to a conclusion similar to this, if not quite equivalent. For
Brouwer, a hypothetical assertion J2 (J1) was essentially an assertion of J2
which proceeds by embedding an actual construction of J1 into a matrix for
a construction of J2. Now, this is not quite the same since it requires that
J1 be proved, so it corresponds more closely with the notion of cut than it
does with hypothetical judgment—but he does seem to agree as far as the
uniformity of the partial proof of the consequent is concerned.
In case it is not entirely evident, let us reason through what would happen
to a proof theory if proofs of hypothetical judgments could be non-uniform.
For one, it would cease to be a proof theory, since two crucial properties
would fail:
(1) Proofs are finitary objects.
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(2) It is effectively determinable in finite time whether an object is a
proof of a judgment.
If a proof of J2 (J1) were construed as a means of converting proofs of
J1 into proofs of J2 (as opposed to the proof-with-a-hole interpretation),
proofs would certainly cease to be finitary objects: for instance, a proof
of |n J (n) (n ∈ N) would be infinitely large, in that it would contain one
branch for each natural number. Then, the failure of the second property
(decidability of wellformedness) is immediate.
Proof-theoretic meaning, however, is hopeless anyway as an interpretation
of intuitionistic logic if one has any intention to justify the creating subject
[16], or even the bar theorem; indeed, the proof-theoretic reading of hypo-
thetical judgment specifically rules out the kind of non-uniform evidence
that is essential in the demonstration of the bar theorem.
3. The Proper Interpretation of Hypothetical Judgment
If we return to Heyting’s original definition of the assertion P ⊃ Q true,
it is clear that he would have to accept any mathematical means of trans-
forming the construction of P true into a construction of Q true, since the
construction r in his definition is not constrained by any uniformity con-
dition: it is merely any effective operation which, when adjoined with a
construction of the premise, effects a construction of the conclusion; and
moreover, r may proceed by appealing to any of the transcendental observa-
tions which are possible by virtue of the truth of P having been experienced
by the subject.
And what of Martin-Lo¨f? In his type theory, only the introduction rules
for the types are given, and the elimination rules are “theorems” (or ad-
missible rules) which are evident only in the non-uniform sense; that is, the
justifications of the elimination rules proceed by introspection on the possi-
ble ways in which their premises could have been experienced. Therefore, if
Martin-Lo¨f’s uniform hypothetical judgment is to be accepted, it is neces-
sary that the statement of the elimination rules be effected using something
that permits a non-uniform demonstration.
Sundholm and Van Atten [14], for instance, distinguish between a hypo-
thetical proof of J2 (J1) and an inference
J1
J2 which expresses the closure of
mathematics under a rule, and say that it is the latter which establishes the
bar theorem, and not the former.
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Martin-Lo¨f on the other hand says specifically that an inference is to be
read as a proof of a hypothetical judgment, and so no real progress is made:
The difference between an inference and a logical conse-
quence, or hypothetical judgement, is that an inference is
a proof of a logical consequence. Thus an inference is the
same as a hypothetical proof. [8]
In light of Martin-Lo¨f’s explanations of the elimination rules which follow
this statement, we cannot accept his claim that inference is the same as
hypothetical proof (as he has defined it), because under that definition even
the following is not a valid inference:
P ∧Q true
P true
Why not? This purports to be a proof of the judgment P true (P ∧Q true),
which is not evident under the uniform explanation of hypothetical judg-
ment. It could be made evident if the definition of a proposition consisted
in the declaration of both its introduction rules and its elimination rules,
but in fact, only the introduction rules are given, and the elimination rules
are simply codifications of common patterns of reasoning from premise to
conclusion.
Indeed, Martin-Lo¨f justifies the elimination rules using the non-uniform
(material, rather than logical) consequence. The above rule, for instance, is
justified as follows:
Proof. If you know P ∧Q true, then you must have a means of verifying
P ∧ Q, whence you must know both P true and Q true; the conclusion is
now immediate. 
If we are to take the explanation of the elimination rules seriously, then,
we must read Martin-Lo¨f as having already at his disposal a kind of hy-
pothetical judgment whose evidence consists in any effective means at all
of transforming the demonstration of the premise into a demonstration of
the conclusion. So, the use of the uniform hypothetical judgment elsewhere
has not relieved us from the need to explain the inference from premise to
conclusion in an elimination rule.
Contra Martin-Lo¨f’s explanation in the Siena lectures, the interpretation
of hypothetical judgment as material consequence is crucial for the semantics
of his type theory, as noted by Dybjer [3].
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3.1. What is the difference between an inference rule and a hypo-
thetical judgment? Is a rule of inference really the same as a consequence
or hypothetical judgment, as Martin-Lo¨f claimed? One way to elucidate the
differences is to consider them in the context of a Beth or Kripke semantics.
The validity of an inference rule
J1
J2 at a world lies in an effective trans-
formation of experiences of J1 at that world to experiences of J2 at that
world; on the other hand, to experience a hypothetical judgment J2 (J1)
at a world is to have a means to transform experiences of J1 at any future
world into experiences of J2.
Construed in this way, judgments can be explained by specifying when/where
they are forced; it is a reasonable requirement that if we shall consider J
to be a judgment, then for any worlds u  v, from u  J we may conclude
v  J (this is called monotonicity). The hypothetical judgment, at least
as explained above, preserves the monotonicity of knowledge by definition,
whereas rules of inference may not in general satisfy this property.
On the contrary, an “admissible rule”
J1
J2 is sensitive to changes in the
state of knowledge, and may cease to be valid if a previously unknown way
to experience J1 is found. Such rules may only be construed as hypothet-
ical judgments if the acts specified by the meanings of their premises are
sufficiently circumscribed so as to satisfy the monotonicity requirement.
Martin-Lo¨f’s identification of the rules of logic with hypothetical judg-
ments, then, only obtains because the concepts of verification of a propo-
sition, and (secondarily) truth of a proposition are fixed in advance for all
time by means of canonical forms and computation respectively.
4. Realizability and Type Theory
Now that we have settled upon an explanation for hypothetical judgment,
let us return to the notions of judgment and proposition, and their respective
concepts of “construction”. Like “proof”, the term “construction” is also
ambiguous in that it may refer to an act of constructing, and it may also
denote a concrete mathematical object.
A construction for a judgment is simply the act of coming to know it: this
is what Martin-Lo¨f calls a demonstration, and if it is to be thought of as an
object, it is at least a tensed, ephemeral one. On the other hand, a construc-
tion for a proposition is a mathematical object, not an experience: it is the
object that the subject constructs during the verification of a proposition.
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This latter sort of construction is called a witness, or, following realizability,
a realizer.
4.1. Realizability Models as Unary Logical Relations. In fact, we
can replace the abstract/synthetic explanations of the propositions in terms
of their verification acts with new explanations in terms of verification ob-
jects (i.e. their canonical witnesses); then, the verification act consists in
constructing a verification object.
A proposition is verified just in case there exists a verification object,
but it is important to understand that this is not to say that a (possi-
bly unknown) verification object may exist outside the subject’s experience
(construction) of it. Rather, this is a trivial equivalence, since to say that
an object exists is the same as to say that the subject has constructed it.3
A realizability model in this simple sense amounts to interpreting the
propositions into unary logical relations. To define a proposition, then,
is to define the unary relation VJP K (which is the species of verification
objects of the proposition P ); then, a separate logical relation EJP K is defined
uniformly over all propositions P by appealing to the computation M ⇒ N
of witnesses to canonical form.
A⇒ A′ VJA′K defined
A set
A⇒ A′ EJA′K(M)
M ∈ A
VJ⊤K ≡ {⋆}
VJ⊥K ≡ {}
VJP ⊃ QK ≡ {(λx)E | |x E ∈ Q (x ∈ P )}
VJP ∧QK ≡ {〈M,N〉 |M ∈ P ,N ∈ Q}
VJP ∨QK ≡ {inl(M) |M ∈ P} ∪ {inr(M) |M ∈ Q}
EJP K ≡ {M |M ⇒M ′,VJP K(M ′)}
The material interpretation of the hypothetical judgment is crucial in
the realizability model; this is because only the verification objects (i.e.
canonical witnesses) are given. All the non-canonical witnesses are explained
3The idea that verification or proof objects exist separately from our experience of them
is part of the realist ontology which is now espoused by Martin-Lo¨f [10], contrary to his
position at the time of the Siena lectures; this view of course cannot be accepted by
Brouwerians, who profess a thoroughly idealist ontology [14, 13].
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via computation, and the use of logical consequence instead of material
consequence in the explanation of VJP ⊃ QK would have been disastrous.
For instance, it should be the case that (λx)〈⋆, ⋆〉 is a witness of ⊥ ⊃ ⊤.
To see if this is the case in the model, let us translate this into a concrete
statement:
(λx)〈⋆, ⋆〉 ∈ ⊥ ⊃ ⊤(4.1)
(λx)〈⋆, ⋆〉 ⇒ (λx)〈⋆, ⋆〉, VJ⊥ ⊃ ⊤K((λx)〈⋆, ⋆〉)(4.2)
|x 〈⋆, ⋆〉 ∈ ⊤ (x ∈ ⊥)(4.3)
|x 〈⋆, ⋆〉 ∈ ⊤ (EJ⊥K(x))(4.4)
|x 〈⋆, ⋆〉 ∈ ⊤ (x⇒M,VJ⊥K(M))(4.5)
And at this time, we may discharge the entire hypothetical judgment,
since we know that the unary relation VJ⊥K is empty, and so there can be
no such M .
If we did not have the material consequence at our disposal, then this
statement would not have been valid, unless we were to eschew the verifi-
cationist meaning explanation and also add “use” rules (i.e. direct elimina-
tions) for each proposition in addition to the verification rules.
4.2. Type Theories as Binary Logical Relations. The unary logical
relations express exactly the content of a realizability model, but they still do
not yield a theory of sets which is sufficient for reasoning about mathematical
objects, which have extensional identity. In order to consider the equality
of sets and witnesses, the unary logical relations are replaced with binary
ones (sc. partial equivalence relations), as follows:
A⇒ A′ B ⇒ B′ VJA′K ≡ VJB′K
A = B set
A = A set
A set
A⇒ A′ M ⇒M ′ N ⇒ N ′ VJA′K(M ′, N ′)
M = N ∈ A
M =M ∈ A
M ∈ A
In order to make an important point about functionality, we will define in-
tuitionistic existential and universal quantification rather than their special
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cases, conjunction and implication.
VJ⊤K ≡ {(⋆, ⋆)}
VJ⊥K ≡ {}
VJ(∀x ∈ A)BK ≡ {((λx)E, (λx)E′) | |y,z [y/x]E = [z/x]E
′ ∈ [y/x]B (y = z ∈ A)}
VJ(∃x ∈ A)BK ≡ {(〈M,N〉, 〈M ′, N ′〉) |M =M ′ ∈ A,N = N ′ ∈ [M/x]B}
VJA ∨BK ≡ {(inl(M), inl(N)) |M = N ∈ A} ∪ {(inr(M), inr(N)) |M = N ∈ B}
EJAK ≡ {(M,N) |M ⇒M ′, N ⇒ N ′,VJAK(M ′, N ′)}
Now, in contrast to the treatment of the quantifiers in formal intuitionistic
logic (or in the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of a topos [7]), in this setting it is
part of their meaning that their verifications should respect the equality of
the domain of discourse; this constraint is called functionality, and reflects
the fact that universal quantification is reconstructed as a more general form
of implication. Within the theory of sets, there is simply not a quantifier
which expresses non-functional generality; in this way, contrary to the state
of affairs in BISH [1], the theorem of choice is in fact verified by a choice
function, not merely a choice operation.
With the extension to the binary logical relation, we now properly treat
the equivalence of propositions (sets) and of witnesses, and we also have a
definitive answer to the question, “What is the purpose of adding a lan-
guage of types and witnesses to the existing system of judgments and their
demonstrations?”
The judgments and demonstrations are the activity of the subject in per-
forming and experiencing mathematics. On the other hand, the theory of
sets that we have defined is, to my mind, the correct level at which to do
mathematics, where objects are concrete and have an extensional identity.
By guaranteeing pervasive functionality, we have embedded in the rich world
of intuitionistic mathematics a haven invulnerable to the paradoxes that
arise from failures of extensionality, such as Diaconescu’s theorem [9, 12].
5. Related Discussion
In the logical framework which forms the basis of Practical Foundations
for Programming Languages [4], Robert Harper treats both logical conse-
quence J1 ⊢ J2 and material consequence J1  J2, which express derivabil-
ity and admissiblity respectively.
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The material consequence (and its open-ended interpretation as a map-
ping from demonstrations of the antecedent to demonstrations of the con-
sequent) formed the backbone of Zeilberger, Harper and Licata’s work on
higher-order focused calculi, which provide a convincing abstract notation
for the traces of verification and use acts in a logic which mixes the verifi-
cationist and pragmatist meaning explanations [19, 6, 18].
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Mark van Atten, Robert Harper, Clarissa
Littler, and Danny Gratzer for helpful conversations about hypothetical
judgment, elimination rules and the bar theorem.
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